PQC Ready · by SDTC Solutions
Our team helps your organisation assess cryptographic exposure, plan the migration, and move toward quantum-safe infrastructure with structure and confidence.
Try Quick ScanWelcome back
Continue your readiness journey, review your progress or take the next structured step.
Signed-in journey
Move through six connected phases, from awareness to continuous assurance.
01 / Why it matters
02 / The quantum risk
Tap any card for the detail →
Encrypted data stolen today can be stored and unlocked the moment a quantum computer is ready.
ExploreA large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography.
ExploreIf signatures can be forged, software updates, certificates and identities can be impersonated.
ExploreData that must stay private for decades — health, legal, state, intellectual property — is the first to fall.
ExploreGrover's algorithm chips away at the symmetric encryption that protects data at rest.
ExploreEmbedded, OT and IoT devices with decade-long lifespans can't simply be patched.
Explore03 / A shared map
Enterprises and organisations are at different stages of PQC awareness and readiness. We use the PQC Enterprise Maturity Model (PQCEMM) to evaluate how prepared an organisation is to manage its transition. The stage-gated result runs from Level 1 to Level 5, with progress and evidence confidence shown separately.
Understand the PQCEMM model →04 / How it works
Getting quantum-ready is a coordinated programme across people, suppliers and technology - from first exposure awareness through continuous assurance.
05 / Standards & guidance
We help you interpret the standards, national roadmaps and regulatory expectations shaping the transition, then turn them into practical priorities for your organisation.
EU PQC Migration guidance
EU Member States, supported by the European Commission, have agreed a roadmap to coordinate the transition to post-quantum cryptography.
Primary audience
National authorities and organisations responsible for:
The roadmap sits alongside NIS2 and sector rules. National implementation and the risk of each application determine the applicable requirements.
Primary reference
European Commission roadmap (opens in a new tab)June 2025, with supporting FAQ. Coordinated transition targets and national implementation.
Migration methods
ETSI migration strategies (opens in a new tab)TR 103 619. Technical guidance for planning a transition to quantum-safe schemes.
EU PQC Migration milestones
The EU roadmap coordinates national preparation and prioritises applications according to risk.
Member States establish national roadmaps and coordinate stakeholders.
Migrate high-risk applications, including critical infrastructure. Plan the remaining transition.
Migrate normal-risk applications and as many low-risk uses as possible.
Roadmap targets. These dates do not create one blanket statutory PQC deadline for every company.
EU PQC Algorithm usage
Use standardised algorithms in suitable protocols, with parameters chosen for the application and the relevant national guidance.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | Key establishment. Creates shared secret key material. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose digital signatures for authenticity and integrity. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures, with larger signatures. |
The roadmap does not prescribe one universal parameter set. Consult national security guidance and the standards relevant to your sector.
The EU roadmap recommends standardised and tested combinations of PQC and traditional cryptography wherever feasible and suitable.
Test interoperability and cryptographic agility. Stateful signature schemes require specialist controls for signing state.
Technical baseline
NIST PQC standards (opens in a new tab)Published algorithm standards and ongoing standardisation work.
European roadmap
Coordinated implementation roadmap (opens in a new tab)National coordination, risk priorities and implementation guidance.
US PQC Migration guidance
NIST provides the algorithm standards. Updated federal direction sets priorities for US agency migration, supported by NCCoE discovery and interoperability work.
Primary audience
Technical leaders and risk owners in:
OMB M-26-15 covers federal systems outside national security systems. National security systems follow separate requirements, including CNSA guidance.
Federal implementation
Execution of the migration to PQC (opens in a new tab)24 June 2026. OMB M-26-15: agency plans, prioritisation and migration phases.
Federal direction
Securing the nation against advanced cryptographic attacks (opens in a new tab)22 June 2026. Executive direction for federal migration and support for critical infrastructure.
Practical migration
NCCoE migration programme (opens in a new tab)Cryptographic discovery, risk management and interoperability testing.
Technical baseline
NIST PQC project (opens in a new tab)Algorithm standards, publications and continuing standardisation work.
US PQC Migration milestones
The 2026 federal programme separates planning, priority key establishment and signature migration.
Agency inventory, assessment and migration planning. OMB plans are due within 120 days of its 24 June 2026 memorandum.
Test deployments and refine the plan using experience from priority systems.
Migrate key establishment for federal high-value assets and high-impact systems. OMB also prioritises highly sensitive and particularly vulnerable systems.
Migrate digital signatures for the priority federal systems.
Complete the remaining migration with consideration of risk and commercial availability.
Federal scope. These dates are not a universal legal deadline for all US businesses. NIST IR 8547 remains an initial public draft, rather than a final standalone mandate.
US PQC Algorithm usage
The published FIPS standards distinguish key establishment from digital signatures. Select algorithms for the protocol and security requirements of the system.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | Key establishment. Creates shared secret key material. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose digital signatures for authenticity and integrity. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures, with larger signatures. |
| LMSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. Requires reliable signing-state management. |
| XMSSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. One-time signing keys must never be reused. |
ML-KEM replaces vulnerable key establishment through suitable protocols. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA address digital signatures. Stateful signing requires strict state management.
Algorithm standardisation does not validate a product by itself. Assess implementation assurance, interoperability and the applicable federal profile.
Migration guidance
NCCoE migration programme (opens in a new tab)Discovery and interoperability work for deploying the NIST standards.
Transition planning
NIST IR 8547 (initial public draft) (opens in a new tab)November 2024. Draft transition guidance; check its status and successor publications.
UK PQC Migration guidance
The NCSC has issued guidance with recommended migration targets to help organisations prepare for and transition to post-quantum cryptography.
Primary audience
Technical decision-makers and risk owners in:
The core timelines are relevant to all organisations. SMEs using mainly commodity IT can typically migrate through vendor updates.
Primary reference
Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (opens in a new tab)20 March 2025. Migration activities and the 2028, 2031 and 2035 targets.
Supporting technical paper
Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography (opens in a new tab)14 August 2024 update. Algorithm recommendations, parameters and hybrid schemes.
UK PQC Migration milestones
NCSC target dates describe when each stage should be complete. Preparation starts now.
Complete discovery and assessment. Plan priorities, supplier dependencies, investment and long-lived hardware roots of trust. Communicate needs to suppliers.
Complete the highest-priority activities, prepare supporting infrastructure and refine the plan for full migration.
Complete migration across systems, services and products. Use the transition to strengthen wider cyber resilience.
Recommended completion targets. Sector constraints and rare technologies may require additional planning.
UK PQC Algorithm usage
NCSC recommends NIST-standardised algorithms and robust implementations, with protocol changes and supplier testing built into the migration.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | Key establishment. ML-KEM-768 for most uses. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose digital signatures. ML-DSA-65 for most uses. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures for specialised uses, including firmware or software signing. |
| LMSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. Requires reliable signing-state management. |
| XMSSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. One-time signing keys must never be reused. |
Replace RSA / DH / ECDH key establishment with ML-KEM through suitable protocols. Replace vulnerable signatures with ML-DSA, evaluating hash-based schemes for specialised signing.
NCSC treats PQC with traditional cryptography as an interim option with a route to PQC-only. For PKI, it favours a single transition to fully PQC authentication.
Use final-standard implementations and appropriate RFC-based protocols. Test interoperability and check for fallback to vulnerable algorithms.
Technical guidance
NCSC algorithm and hybrid guidance (opens in a new tab)Recommended parameters, specialised signatures and the transition to PQC-only.
Sweden PQC Migration guidance
Swedish NCSC guidance sets a national transition timetable, with early action on ownership, cryptographic inventory and sensitive information.
Primary audience
Leadership and technical teams in:
The 2030 and 2035 dates are guidance targets. Legal frameworks impose duties within their own scope and do not set one universal PQC deadline for every company. Classified information follows separate rules.
Primary reference
National PQC migration recommendations (opens in a new tab)NCSC, 2026. National timetable, governance and technical recommendations.
European context
EU coordinated implementation roadmap (opens in a new tab)June 2025. Coordinated European migration targets.
Legal framework
Cybersecurity Act (2025:1506) (opens in a new tab)In force 15 January 2026. Security measures include cryptography and encryption procedures.
Security measures
MCFFS 2026:11 (opens in a new tab)In force 1 October 2026. Applies within the regulation’s defined scope.
National policy
Sweden’s quantum technology strategy (opens in a new tab)August 2026. National policy for quantum technology.
QKD position
Joint position paper on QKD (opens in a new tab)January 2024. Swedish Armed Forces and partner security agencies.
Sweden PQC Migration milestones
The national recommendations prioritise high-risk information, within the wider European transition.
Assign executive responsibility and budget. Inventory cryptography and classify information.
Complete high-risk migrations. Prioritise information that must remain sensitive for more than ten years.
Complete the transition, including lower-risk uses, final evaluation and fine-tuning.
Member States establish national roadmaps and coordinate stakeholders.
Migrate high-risk applications, including critical infrastructure. Plan the remaining transition.
Migrate normal-risk applications and as many low-risk uses as possible.
Guidance targets. Useful evidence includes approved plans, named owners, supplier actions, migration tests and a final review; these are practical suggestions for evidencing progress.
Sweden PQC Algorithm usage
NCSC identifies replacements for vulnerable public-key cryptography. Much existing symmetric cryptography can remain.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | Key establishment. Creates shared secret key material. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose digital signatures for authenticity and integrity. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures, with larger signatures. |
| LMSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. Requires reliable signing-state management. |
| XMSSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. One-time signing keys must never be reused. |
Use ML-KEM for key establishment, ML-DSA or SLH-DSA for signatures, and LMS / XMSS where reliable signing-state management is possible.
Use standardised, tested protocols and implementations. Where appropriate, combine PQC with traditional cryptography using established constructions.
The joint security-agency paper favours PQC for broad migration. QKD has limited niche uses and needs further security assurance. QKD still requires authentication.
National recommendations
NCSC algorithm guidance (opens in a new tab)Recommended algorithms and standardised protocol deployment.
QKD position
Joint position paper on QKD (opens in a new tab)Security limitations and the role of PQC.
Netherlands PQC Migration guidance
The Dutch central-government strategy sets a migration timetable. NCSC-NL and AIVD guidance help organisations assess exposure and choose a migration approach.
Primary audience
Decision-makers responsible for:
The 2030 / 2035 dates are roadmap and policy targets, rather than a blanket statutory deadline for every company. Check the scope of Cbw/Cbb, BIO2, DORA and applicable EU implementing rules.
Government timetable
Rijksbrede Quantumstrategie (opens in a new tab)5 October 2026. Central-government PQC migration milestones.
European context
EU coordinated implementation roadmap (opens in a new tab)June 2025, with supporting FAQ. European migration targets.
Migration methods
PQC Migration Handbook, second edition (opens in a new tab)AIVD, CWI and TNO, 2024. Risk assessment, planning and technical choices.
Security guidance
AIVD quantum-threat guidance (opens in a new tab)27 March 2026. Risk priorities, key establishment and hybrid constructions.
Government policy
Rijksbreed Beleidskader Cryptografie (opens in a new tab)March 2025. Central-government cryptography policy.
Preparation
NCSC-NL quantum-safe guidance (opens in a new tab)Preparation steps and explanation of the European transition.
Netherlands PQC Migration milestones
Dutch central-government policy adds preparation and procurement milestones to the European roadmap.
Include quantum risk in risk management and establish cryptography policy.
Address harvested-data risk, prepare migration plans and pilots, maintain cryptographic asset management, and allocate resources.
Set PQC procurement requirements and develop guidance for essential companies.
Complete high-risk uses, adopt PQC by default in software and firmware, and support testing and standards.
Complete medium-risk uses and low-risk uses as far as possible.
Member States establish national roadmaps and coordinate stakeholders.
Migrate high-risk applications, including critical infrastructure. Plan the remaining transition.
Migrate normal-risk applications and as many low-risk uses as possible.
End-year policy targets for central government and EU roadmap targets. Risk may require faster action.
Netherlands PQC Algorithm usage
Dutch guidance combines application-specific parameters with tested hybrid constructions and supplier readiness.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | Handbook advice: ML-KEM-1024 preferred; ML-KEM-768 is an acceptable alternative. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | Handbook advice: ML-DSA-87 preferred; ML-DSA-65 is an acceptable alternative. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures. Handbook recommends 192 / 256 variants. |
| LMSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. Requires reliable signing-state management. |
| XMSSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. One-time signing keys must never be reused. |
AIVD advises ML-KEM or FrodoKEM for key establishment, preferring FrodoKEM when greater confidence in the construction is needed. Use suitable PQC signatures and AES-256.
Combine lattice-based PQC with established traditional cryptography using tested implementations. NCSC TLS guidance recommends considering X25519MLKEM768.
AIVD and partner agencies favour PQC. QKD needs dedicated infrastructure and authentication and has limited security maturity. It does not replace PQC migration.
Parameter advice
PQC Migration Handbook, §4.2 (opens in a new tab)Algorithm categories and application-specific choices.
Replacement guidance
AIVD quantum-threat guidance (opens in a new tab)ML-KEM, FrodoKEM and hybrid constructions.
QKD position
Joint position paper on QKD (opens in a new tab)Infrastructure, authentication and security limitations.
Canada PQC Migration guidance
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security describes how federal departments should prepare, identify vulnerable cryptography and manage the transition.
Primary audience
Accountable decision-makers and technical teams in:
The roadmap’s milestone dates address Government of Canada systems. ITSP.40.111 gives algorithm recommendations for UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECTED A and PROTECTED B information.
Primary reference
Government of Canada PQC roadmap (opens in a new tab)23 June 2025. ITSM.40.001: federal planning and migration milestones.
Technical guidance
Cryptographic algorithms, ITSP.40.111 (opens in a new tab)Recommended algorithms, parameters and phase-out advice.
Canada PQC Migration milestones
The federal roadmap combines departmental planning with staged system migration.
Develop departmental migration plans. Begin progress reporting and continue it annually.
Complete PQC migration for high-priority federal systems.
Complete migration for the remaining government systems.
Federal roadmap targets. Completion requires vulnerable algorithms to be disabled, isolated or tunnelled, as described in the source.
Canada PQC Algorithm usage
ITSP.40.111 recommends post-quantum algorithms for UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECTED A and PROTECTED B information.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose key establishment. ITSP.40.111 lists 512, 768 and 1024 parameter sets. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose signatures. ITSP.40.111 lists 44, 65 and 87 parameter sets. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures, with larger signatures. |
| LMSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. Requires reliable signing-state management. |
| XMSSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. One-time signing keys must never be reused. |
Use ML-KEM for key establishment and ML-DSA or SLH-DSA for signatures. Follow the publication’s phase-out advice for existing algorithms.
LMS and XMSS require reliable state management. Track Cyber Centre protocol guidance as post-quantum configurations become available.
Algorithm recommendations
ITSP.40.111 (opens in a new tab)Algorithm profiles and parameter choices for the defined information classifications.
Australia PQC Migration guidance
The Australian Signals Directorate recommends a planned transition to PQC, with completion by the end of 2030 and continuing validation afterwards.
Primary audience
Risk owners and technical leaders responsible for:
Apply ISM controls according to the organisation’s obligations and information classification. The planning publication sets recommended transition milestones.
Primary reference
Planning for post-quantum cryptography (opens in a new tab)September 2025. Recommended 2026, 2028 and 2030 transition milestones.
Technical controls
ISM guidelines for cryptography (opens in a new tab)September 2026 edition. Approved algorithms, procurement and hybrid guidance.
Australia PQC Migration milestones
ASD recommends ceasing traditional asymmetric cryptography by the end of 2030.
Account for security goals, risk tolerance, dependencies and the value of data.
Start with critical systems, sensitive or long-lived data, and systems that are difficult to update.
Complete the PQC transition, allowing contingency for delays and technology changes.
Monitor and validate implementations and respond to vulnerabilities and evolving threats.
ASD recommendations. The applicability of ISM controls depends on the organisation and the information being protected.
Australia PQC Algorithm usage
The ISM gives specific procurement requirements for systems intended to remain in use beyond 2030.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | ISM procurement control: support ML-KEM-1024 by no later than 2030. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | ISM procurement control: support ML-DSA-87 by no later than 2030. |
New equipment, applications and libraries should also support SHA-384, SHA-512 and AES-256 for use beyond 2030.
ASD does not recommend PQC / traditional hybrid schemes, but does not prohibit them. If used, at least one component must be an ASD-approved cryptographic algorithm.
Maintain a transition plan and validate the actual algorithms in use against the applicable ISM profile.
Algorithm and hybrid controls
ISM guidelines for cryptography (opens in a new tab)Controls 1917, 1996 and 2073, with explanatory guidance.
International PQC Migration guidance
Algorithm standards, migration guidance and protocol specifications serve different roles. A deployment needs the relevant combination for its products and markets.
Primary audience
Teams responsible for:
There is no single global regulatory PQC deadline. Track national policy, sector obligations and the status of each specification used in your deployment.
Algorithms
NIST PQC project (opens in a new tab)Published algorithm standards and continuing standardisation.
Migration framework
ETSI migration strategies (opens in a new tab)TR 103 619. Guidance for a planned transition to quantum-safe schemes.
TLS protocol
Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 (opens in a new tab)RFC 9954, July 2026. Informational framework for hybrid key exchange.
SSH protocol
ML-KEM hybrid key exchange for SSH (opens in a new tab)RFC 10042, August 2026. Informational specification for SSH hybrid methods.
International PQC Migration milestones
These are published standards milestones, rather than a global migration deadline.
FIPS 203, 204 and 205 establish ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA.
RFC 9954 describes hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3. It is an Informational RFC.
RFC 10042 defines ML-KEM with traditional key exchange for SSH. It is an Informational RFC.
Migration schedules remain specific to the jurisdiction, sector and application. An RFC’s publication alone does not establish product support or certification.
TLS protocol
Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 (opens in a new tab)RFC 9954, July 2026. Informational framework for hybrid key exchange.
SSH protocol
ML-KEM hybrid key exchange for SSH (opens in a new tab)RFC 10042, August 2026. Informational specification for SSH hybrid methods.
International PQC Algorithm usage
A common technical baseline distinguishes key establishment, stateless signatures and specialised stateful signatures.
| Algorithm / standard | Usage and parameters |
|---|---|
| ML-KEMFIPS 203 (opens in a new tab) | Key establishment. Creates shared secret key material. |
| ML-DSAFIPS 204 (opens in a new tab) | General-purpose digital signatures for authenticity and integrity. |
| SLH-DSAFIPS 205 (opens in a new tab) | Stateless hash-based signatures, with larger signatures. |
| LMSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. Requires reliable signing-state management. |
| XMSSSP 800-208 (opens in a new tab) | Stateful hash-based signatures. One-time signing keys must never be reused. |
Use the standardised algorithm names rather than treating older candidate versions as interchangeable. Select parameters through the relevant application and national profile.
A protocol specification defines how algorithms work together. Confirm its status, supported implementations and interoperability before deployment.
Algorithm standards
NIST PQC project (opens in a new tab)Published standards and the status of further algorithms.
TLS framework
RFC 9954 (opens in a new tab)Informational guidance for hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3.
SSH methods
RFC 10042 (opens in a new tab)Informational specification for ML-KEM hybrid SSH key exchange.
Sources reviewed 11 October 2026. Select a region and topic to explore its guidance.
The US standards body that finalised the first post-quantum algorithms — ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA — now the global baseline for migration. Read the full guide →
The UK National Cyber Security Centre, whose guidance sets out how organisations should plan and stage their move to post-quantum cryptography. Read the full guide →
The EU Digital Operational Resilience Act — financial entities must manage and evidence their ICT and cryptographic risk. Read the full guide →
The EU directive raising cyber-security and risk-management duties across essential and important sectors. Read the full guide →
The international standard for an information-security management system — the framework many organisations already certify against. Read the full guide →
The NSA's Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, setting quantum-resistant requirements for US national-security systems. Read the full guide →
06 / Who we help
These are examples, not an exhaustive target market. Quantum exposure follows long-lived data, products, infrastructure and supply chains across every sector.
Payments, identity and customer data that must stay trustworthy for years — under heavy regulation, and long after Q-Day.
Subscriber data and network infrastructure with decade-long service lifespans to protect.
Operational technology, supply chains and continuity of services a whole nation depends on.
Tenant confidentiality, platform trust and key management at massive scale.
Citizen data and sensitive archives that must stay sealed for decades.
Patient records and research data with lifetime confidentiality requirements.
Privileged archives and client confidentiality that must hold, indefinitely.
Connected products, industrial control, embedded cryptography and supplier networks with long replacement cycles.
07 / Leadership
Chief Executive Officer
Helps organisations of all sizes navigate the move to post-quantum cryptography before quantum-capable threats become operational.
Martin began his career at Intel, where he led the operational growth of their largest European R&D site and later directed Intel's global Risk and Controls function — building enterprise-wide frameworks for business continuity and asset protection.
In 2020 he founded SDTC Solutions, a consultancy focused on strategic transformation and risk-controlled delivery. He has a background in Computer Science with post-graduate study at Imperial College Business School, and serves as an elected councillor and a magistrate.
Director, Sales & Business Development
Helps organisations in financial services, defence, energy and healthcare turn complex technology shifts into risk-managed plans.
A graduate of Royal Holloway with a Master's in International Security, Mikhail builds partnerships across the UK, Europe, Central Asia and the Gulf region.
He began his career at the intersection of government procurement and international health diplomacy, and today advises leadership teams on emerging cyber and resilience risks, including post-quantum readiness.
Chief Technology Officer
Leads the technical strategy for assessing and addressing exposure to post-quantum cryptography risk.
Alexey built his foundational expertise at Intel, helping establish their largest European R&D site across platform performance, wireless transmission and processor architecture.
He completed an MSc at Stanford Graduate School of Business, co-founded an ASIC services business, and studied Quantum Computing at MIT — sharpening his focus on the intersection of quantum theory and real-world cryptographic risk.
PR, Policy & Advocacy Executive
Leads the firm's marketing and media programmes, brand development and cyber-policy advocacy.
Anastasiia began her career in Ukraine in public affairs and strategic communications, including overseeing PR for the Ukrainian Pavilion at the Venice Architecture Biennale.
She holds a Master's in International Law from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and is reading for an MPA at the London School of Economics.
08 / Responsible use
PQC Ready uses AI to make complex readiness work easier to navigate, while keeping people accountable for the method, the decisions and the relationship with you. We explain when AI is involved, minimise the information required and use an NDA when a confidential engagement needs sensitive evidence.
Quinn is an AI-assisted guide. It explains questions, helps you structure answers and can prepare clearly labelled advisory material. The assessment method and service boundaries remain defined by PQC Ready.
How Quinn uses AI →The free Quick Scan asks only for the information needed to create an indicative snapshot. We keep the purpose visible, separate a Quick Scan from a formal maturity assessment and avoid hidden reuse.
Read the data boundary →Registered workspaces separate account data and assessment history. When detailed evidence or confidential architecture is needed, we first agree the scope, access and handling expectations under an NDA.
Public versus protected tools →09 / Get started
Bring a board question, a regulatory pressure point or a technical uncertainty. The first step is making the exposure visible.
Not sure where to start? Use the guide →Not sure where you actually stand? Try the Quick Scan with Quinn — a free, no-pressure first read on your quantum readiness, with a clear next move.
Try Quick ScanFollow PQC Ready on LinkedIn ↗
PQC Ready is a brand of SDTC Solutions Ltd (SC698550), incorporated on 12 May 2021. Registered office: Suite 2/3 2nd Floor, 48 West George Street, Glasgow, G2 1BP.